Forewords by Shimon Peres and Dennis Ross,
Afterword by Abu Ala

PEACE FIRST

A New Model to End War

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Author of *The Process*, A *New York Times* Notable Book of the Year

an excerpt from

Peace First:
A New Model to End War

by Uri Savir
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FOREWORD

by Shimon Peres

PEACE REFLECTS THE MOST FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT AND HUMAN desire—the right to life. Peace is the right of a parent to protect a child from poverty and conflict, and peace is the profound social diktat that a man must put down his gun. And although peace should therefore be considered the natural state of affairs, war seems to be the only constant in our history. Peace is the time between wars, and war is *legitimately* employed to pursue a society's interests.

Technology and the free market economy have transformed the world into a global village, and the phenomenon of globalization has become the pivotal element that should create world peace. Yet the unprecedented wealth generated by the forces of globalization has been amassed by the developed world rather than substantively dispersed to the poor and developing nations so desperate to reap its fruits. While the champions and beneficiaries of globalization continue to accumulate wealth, know-how, and power; to reach unparalleled levels of education, communication, and quality of life; and to create a megaculture as a byproduct, the other half still lives differently. The developing world remains impoverished and disease-stricken, and many of these countries exist to sustain conflict.

The ever-increasing gap between the developing and developed worlds is engendering a new conflict; the impoverished now threaten world peace. The union of poverty, fundamentalist ideologies, and weapons of mass destruction is a devastating hybrid that has planted its roots in the fertile lands of frustrated and estranged constituencies.

In such conditions, creating and sustaining peace is an arduous task. And in this sense, the peace-desiring world does not face an enemy in the traditional sense. Rather, we must confront the issues of the day: poverty, extremism, terrorism, dissemination of unconventional weaponry, pollution, and cultural estrangement.

Globalization has intensified these challenges. The power of the nation-state is in steady decline as it becomes decentralized, moving from central governments to other institutions. Capital has moved from the public sector to the private sector, promoting social values has become the task of nongovernmental organizations, and even war is less an act of state than an operation of violent terrorist groups.

In this state of the world, peacemaking must be reformed. A new coalition of forces must pave the way to a citizens' peace, involving a complex puzzle of participants and interactions to ensure the sustainability of peace.

In this book, Uri Savir has endeavored to confront these important challenges by offering a solution to the peacemaking puzzle that is courageous, innovative, and based on his extensive experience as a peacemaker. This groundbreaking book presents readers with a fresh approach to the most important challenge of this century—making peace. It will no doubt contribute to the necessary debate on the critical question of how to make peace in our era.

FOREWORD

by Dennis Ross

FOR SOMEONE WHO WORKED CLOSELY WITH URI SAVIR DURING Israel's negotiations with its neighbors in the 1990s, it comes as no surprise to me that he would write a book on why we must revolutionize the way we approach peacemaking and how we can do so. I say this because, as a negotiator, Uri Savir brought not just skills, creativity, and insight to the task; he brought empathy and compassion as well.

Uri, first and foremost, is an Israeli patriot. But he is also a humanist. He believed that peace with Israel's neighbors was in Israel's national interests. He believed in a peace of mutual interest, not a peace of surrender. He believed in a peace of openness, with reconciliation and cooperation, not a cold peace of isolation and separation. He believed in a peace in which each side could gain, not one in which he would necessarily get the better of his counterparts. (That did not mean he would let them get the better of him or his country.)

Throughout the Oslo process, Uri saw peace as most enduring if it reflected the self-interest of both sides. Peace could not be a favor that one side did for the other, nor could it represent a sacrifice of something so basic that one side could not sustain or fulfill the commitments made.

Uri was not sentimental in his negotiating, but he worked hard to understand the needs of the other side—whether it was in his negotiations with the Palestinians or with the Syrians. For him this was not a sacrifice but a hardheaded way of achieving what Israel needed; the more he could demonstrate that he understood what the other side needed (and could explain it), the more he could

explain what he needed on his side to be responsive. He took a long view of peacemaking, always having a strategic vision of where he wanted to go and not letting short-term tactics undercut his longer-term direction.

For someone who labored so hard to make Oslo work, only to see it come crashing down years after his efforts from 1993 to 1996, it is not surprising that Uri would ask questions about its demise and try to learn the lessons that might be applied to peacemaking today. Many such questions are embedded in this book, and they help explain the model for peacemaking that he proposes. For example:

- Why was it so hard to produce a peacemaking process that gained public support and acceptance of the peace narrative?
- Why did the opponents of peace, especially those who used violence and terror, always seem to have the upper hand?
- Why was such a narrow approach taken to peacemaking, putting a premium on security but not on building civil society or the economic underpinnings of peace?
- Why wasn't the region and the international community enlisted to more effectively support the peacemaking process?
- Why weren't the donor countries and their private sectors called on to invest in joint economic developments between Israelis and Palestinians, not only to produce economic peace dividends but also to foster a new psychology of cooperation and joint ventures?
- Why wasn't more done to connect the two societies and the youths in those societies? Peace, after all, is made between peoples and not just among national abstractions.
- Why was the strategy for implementation of agreements so limited and always so vulnerable to being frustrated?

Although I may be posing these questions more explicitly than

Uri does in the book, he offers answers to these and other questions to help explain why Oslo and other such efforts to resolve historic conflicts have not succeeded. Uri presents not just a new model for peacemaking but also a strategy for pursuing it.

He calls for a "participatory peace" in which citizens are integrated into the effort. He speaks of the need for "glocalization," in which the new reality of decentralization from national governments is recognized and in which cities across national boundaries and around the globe are enlisted to work together on common problems. He refers to the need to develop a "peace ecology" in which the culture of peace and cooperation is nurtured, as opposed to the traditional mind-set that sees peace agreements as more formal and geared only toward the cessation of conflict. He focuses on "peace building" not just peacemaking, arguing that building peace through connecting societies, promoting common economic ventures, and creating sports and cultural programs among the youth will do more to make peace a reality than simply talking about it.

Finally, Uri calls for "creative diplomacy," the need to bring many different local, regional, and international actors into the process. In addition, he offers a new tutorial on how best to negotiate. This is a book that offers not only a new taxonomy of terms for peacemaking but also a new theory about what is required and how to do it.

Uri is not motivated only by the failures of the past. Instead, he is deeply troubled by the new threats he sees emerging in a globalized world in which there is an enormous underclass left out and left behind—a reality that fosters anger, alienation, and frustration and that broadens the appeal of those ready to engage in apocalyptic terrorist acts. Ongoing historic conflicts also create a fertile breeding ground for suicidal attackers, and the potential marriage of the worst weapons with actors ready to commit unspeakable acts of terror on a mass scale creates very plausible doomsday scenarios. Uri starts the book with such a scenario in mind, to explain why we must take a revolutionary approach to peacemaking.

Uri is focused not only on resolving historic conflicts but also on thinking about how we use the tools of globalization—the new means of connecting citizens and the new focal points of power, such as mayors less hamstrung by bureaucracies—to overcome the international divides that create a context for conflict.

Not every reader of this book will buy the argument that security can be downplayed relative to the need to promote cooperation. But this is not a book that requires acceptance of every detailed proposal. Instead, it is a book that requires us to stretch our minds and decide that it is time to modernize our approach to peacemaking—just as war has always commanded new technologies, new innovations, and new doctrines.

When Uri Savir says it is time to modernize our approach to peace, he is surely correct. When he tells us we need a peace barometer or a new talisman for implementation of peace agreements, we ought to listen. His book charts a new course for peacemaking that is desperately needed. For someone who has waged the battle for peace along with him, I share the view that we need a revolutionary approach to peacemaking. One thing is for sure: leaders trying to resolve historic conflicts need help from within and from without to marshal the wherewithal to confront both history and mythology. Uri Savir is certainly doing his part to help.

INTRODUCTION

Making Peace in a World at War

THIS BOOK IS THE RESULT OF MY PERSONAL AND NATIONAL distress.

From a personal perspective, I wrote this book while recovering from a severe stroke. It is believed that distress sharpens one's thinking; this was certainly my experience. In writing this book I was reconnecting with life. For me, there is no stronger expression of life than yearning for peace.

In national terms, this book emerged from a place of disappointment regarding the implementation of the Oslo Accords. As chief negotiator for Israel, I was profoundly invested in the process. Yet, despite the agreement's historical achievements, both Israelis and Palestinians are still trapped within a culture of conflict; the region remains pitted with emotional and practical obstacles to peace.

This distress, I believe, is not mine alone; the struggle of Israel and Palestine is symptomatic of the struggles in the world at large. In 1945, there were fewer than 20 high- and medium-intensity conflicts worldwide. By 2007, that number had risen to one hundred thirty, including twenty-five "severe crises" and six wars characterized by massive amounts of violence, according to the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research's Conflict Barometer 2007.[1] A vast majority of the more than one hundred partial and full peace agreements signed over the past two decades[2] have endured severe sustainability issues or have simply fallen apart. And despite the fourteen Nobel Peace Prizes that have drifted through the Middle East, South Africa, and Northern Ireland,[3] not one region fully enjoys the true fruits of peace.

In this light, our future as a species looks dim indeed. But I believe our current path is defined less by the inevitabilities of human nature and more by structural failures in the way we make peace. Consider: Little in today's world is more progressive than modern warfare. High-tech intelligence-collection methods, laser-guided missiles that surgically destroy targets, vision-enhancing technology that enables night missions, and other devices straight out of science fiction offer warmakers a buffet of enticing tools that were not available during the World Wars, let alone during nineteenth-century battles.

On the other hand, few things are more archaic than today's peacemaking strategies. Contemporary peace processes and treaties mirror those of the past; our strategies have been left stranded somewhere in the nineteenth century. I do not mean that modern technologies are not manifest in current peace efforts; computers and the Internet are integral parts of planning and negotiations. But while the social, political, and economic elements of societies have evolved to encompass globalization, modern technology, and communication, peacemaking as a strategy has remained stagnant.

The inability of peacemakers to cope with progress is linked to the traditional character of peacemaking. Throughout human history, peacemaking has served to unravel the historical knots of military issues, security, and the distribution of power and physical assets, such as land and natural resources in colonial times; rarely has it established the groundwork for a future peace. The fact that many of today's peacemakers are yesterday's warmakers—or worse, simultaneously operate as warmakers—makes force seem like a realistic way to "keep the peace." Thus, strategic security considerations maintain their status as the centerpiece in the transition from violence to nonviolence, and peace is merely perceived as the time between wars.

This cannot continue. As long as we view peace as simply one point on a continuum of war, we will never create real, lasting peace. We are still convinced that behind every conflict lies a culprit—but

the enemy is not the Other; it is our own archaic definition of what peace is and how to achieve it.

We stand today at a crossroads. In one direction lie conflict, mistrust, and hostility. If we continue down this path, as we have done for ages, the following scenario is not unlikely: A chemical terror attack on a Tel Aviv subway sparks a series of targeted bombings against the Iranian Embassy in Beirut. As Lebanese emergency personnel clear away the wreckage, hundreds of thousands of people demonstrate in front of the US Delegation in Tehran. Iran's president threatens to attack US military forces stationed on the Golan Heights, and the US president announces a high alert situation and threatens the use of nuclear weapons against Iran. CNN broadcasts a special appeal by religious leaders to prevent an apocalypse; the United Nations deems the world on the verge of disaster.

But there is another path, one that leads to a future of cooperation and understanding. This book points the way toward this new direction—a revolutionary model for modern peace. It reflects the changes wrought by globalization, including the erosion of the nation-state's power and the consolidation of power within the private sector and civil society. It lays out a road map for transition from an outmoded definition of peacemaking to a modern one, from an exclusive to a participatory process, from a culture of war to a culture of peace.

The concepts in this book have been distilled from a lifetime of experience. My professional life has been dedicated to peacemaking and peacebuilding; I am a man obsessed. I have endeavored to *make* peace with the Palestinians as Israel's chief negotiator of the Oslo Accords, and with Syria and Jordan as the head of our foreign ministry. I also have attempted to *build* peace through the establishment of two nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), the Peres Center for Peace in Tel Aviv and the Glocal Forum in Rome. These NGOs have supported activities that foster cooperation between enemies and former enemies in the Middle East; in the African nations of Ethiopia, Eritrea, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone; in

the European regions of Northern Ireland and the former Yugoslavia; and in the Asian nations of Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan.

Over the years, I have received invaluable guidance from individuals who have combined passion and practicality in their tireless efforts toward peace: my late father, Leo Savir, who was a brilliant and sophisticated soldier for peace; my political father, Shimon Peres, a great visionary, an unmatched statesman, and a man of the world; my wife, Aliza, who carries the torch of peace and possesses a wonderful gift of abstraction; my daughter, Maya, with her most pure values; and many friends and colleagues, including Amnon Lipkin-Shahak, a man of integrity; Yossi Ginossar, who is not with us today but who pushed hard for peace and reconciled defense with human understanding; my partner at the Peres Center for Peace, Dr. Ron Pundak, who is a significant individual in the realm of civil society; Abu Ala, my Palestinian counterpart, who, while he sat on the other side of the table, taught me a great deal through his wisdom and creative peacemaking; James Wolfensohn, the former president of the World Bank, a man of peace who understands better than anyone the link between economic development and peacemaking; Terje Rod-Larsen, the facilitator of the Oslo process and a man of true peace and humanity; Dennis Ross, the most committed and wise peace mediator in the US administration; and many more.

Influenced by these and other individuals, my approach to peacemaking is based on an ideological framework that places equality between human beings at its pinnacle; this is an equality that cannot exist in war. I am not a pacifist. I know that there are just and ultimately beneficial wars, but I believe these wars are limited. War is not heaven-sent but man-made; it is a product of human nature and is thus shaped by human desires, such as the preservation of identity, greater control over territory, and the expansion of resources. Paradoxically, many feel comfort in the culture of conflict—the comfort of the status quo.

However, I believe the greatest desire of a human being is the desire to survive. This desire must be translated into the most basic

right, to live and let live—in other words, the right to peace. From this perspective, peace is not only a strategic objective but also a fulfillment of our most fundamental human desires.

Both the United States and Israel have recently learned firsthand the difficulty of fighting wars against guerilla forces and against terror. It is perhaps the first time in history that developing countries or independent groups have the ability to endanger world peace. In an era in which the weak have become strong—based on fertile grounds of fundamentalism, fed by poverty, religious extremism, and the proliferation of unconventional weapons—peace has become the most necessary and useful wall of defense. Military power in the traditional sense no longer deters rogue armies, as the United States has learned from Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Making peace has not become easier, but it is an imperative.

The US administration emphasizes political reform and democratization as conditions for peace. The importance of democracy is indisputable, but it is not enough to ensure either short- or long-term peace. It is true that democracies have rarely waged war against each other, but it is also true that democracies *have* waged wars, some necessary, some less so. Furthermore, in situations of social and economic frustration, pro-peace forces can be outvoted in democratic societies; free elections can bring fundamentalist and extremist regimes to power—just look at the 2006 parliamentary elections in the Palestinian Authority.

Iraq is another case in point. Despite massive military attacks and the imposition of "democracy," the United States has been unable to bring peace to the region. The insurgency—acting in opposition to coalition forces, their Iraqi partners, and innocent civilians—has not diminished. Iraq without Saddam Hussein is further from peace than was ever anticipated. The combination of frustration, poverty, and hostility, married with terrorism and the upsurge of nonconventional weapons, has rendered the traditional balance of power irrelevant. Iran is yet another prime example of this power inversion.

Another theory popular among global actors suggests that

economy is the key to peace; with regional and local economic development at stake, both sides in a conflict will have too much to lose and will therefore opt for peace. Theoretically, this is true. In reality, however, economic development is an important but not a sufficient—or even a realistic—condition for peace. Conflict states, such as those in the Middle East and Africa, often experience massive socioeconomic gaps as a result of inflated defense budgets.[4] Poor populations suffer the most under these conditions, as military spending takes priority over educational and health development. As a result, the poor understandably view peace as the revolution of the rich, and they rebel against it. Thus, regional economic development before peace is extremely difficult—virtually impossible. Legal and psychological barriers often prevent cooperation, and instability prevents external investment, especially by the private sector, which does not tend to take risks in unstable regions.

Besides, time is precious; peace cannot simply be the domino effect of other processes—it must come first. The international community must make an astute and innovative shift in its approach to peace: peacemaking must be modernized to reflect the new world order and should be set as the first priority on the international agenda.

To begin, we must recognize that governments, within the current framework of the international system, will not be the champions of peace. Governments may facilitate peace, but first the international system must be reformed to create a peacemaking coalition in which governments will serve as but one of the major players. Even then, there are limits to the argument that the new world governance of globalism and regionalism will resolve issues of war and peace.

On the contrary, peacemaking must be decentralized, and world citizens—through the medium of local governments and nongovernmental organizations—must be willing and able participants. Peace can thus become democratized, and a participatory process involving the hearts and minds of individuals can be ingrained within the international system. Peace must be engaged at the

grassroots. It can never be sustained purely by a balance of power; it is sustainable only if a society wills it. This is crucial in conflict-laden regions, where the potential for violent opposition is inherent. Put simply, it is easier to democratize peace than to democratize autocratic societies.

After we change our approach to security and the distribution of power and assets during peacemaking, governments and societies will have to confront complex and urgent notions of stabilization from an alternative perspective. The motivation to *not* employ weapons is more crucial than a state's capacity to develop and use them; hence, the routine security element that is still considered the focal point in a transition from violence to peace has become less pertinent.

In essence, modern peace depends on the mobility that societies stand to gain from peace rather than on the power that emanates from the use of violence. Social, economic, and cultural attributes are critical to redirecting countries toward a culture of peace. Throughout this book, I focus on new and broader definitions of security, social mobility, the creation of a culture of peace, and integrative and cooperative regional economic development. Ultimately, I present a new model for peace leadership that deals with peace as both a means and an end—including the creation of a participatory political system and the necessary reform of the international peace support system.

Part I of this book analyzes the current problems with peace, identifying obsolete elements and structural weaknesses of traditional peace processes and treaties during the last century. Current peacemaking efforts are plagued by outdated perceptions and security dogmas that lack notions of social mobility, that bureaucratize the process, that represent a revolution of the elite, and that promote suspicion and hostility; these efforts must be modernized in light of the evolving international system. I also highlight the Oslo process in retrospect, because this is the peace process with which I was most involved and because it represents a mixed model of both outdated and modern peacemaking elements.

Part 2 introduces an innovative model for modern peace that opens the "closed doors" of most diplomatic encounters and invites all members of society to contribute to the creation of lasting peace. Although the suggestion might seem surprising coming from a veteran of secret diplomacy, experience has taught me that the modern house of peace must be built on the following four pillars: participatory peace and glocalization, peace ecology, peacebuilding, and creative diplomacy.

Participatory peace and glocalization integrates *local* agents into *global* issues. Current peacemaking involves narrow groups of leaders and diplomats—often the same people who lead war efforts in the first place. To achieve sustainable peace, we must decentralize the process and involve people from all segments of society. The ideals and goals of peaceful cooperation can be introduced by national governments, but local actors—city mayors, heads of local organizations, and members of civil society—will ensure their implementation. Cities can be linked by tourism, trade, youth projects, and more, creating a "glocal" web of entities invested in lasting peace.

Peace ecology involves a transition from a psychological and cultural environment of war to one of peace, based on common values, tolerance, and coexistence. Societies, like individuals, often define themselves by how they are different from others; during conflict, these differences become amplified and are used to justify aggression toward the enemy. By opening lines of communication and emphasizing commonalities rather than differences, those physical and psychological barriers can be dissolved. Media campaigns and cooperation between conflict groups are critical elements of infusing post-conflict societies with notions of human rights and equality.

Societies and governments act according to the dominant values and myths of the day, which is why peace ecology must address a society's beliefs and ideals at its roots. People must consciously move from a culture of war—defined by nationalistic values and hostility toward the enemy—to a culture of peace, in which coexistence

with the former enemy is seen as beneficial. The shift can germinate both externally, through international and regional players, and internally, within the conflict area.

Peacebuilding focuses on cooperative activities and projects that build physical, financial, and social bridges between former enemies. Real peace is not merely the absence of war; it is the creation of links between adversaries where no links existed before. Cooperation in joint ventures generates more effective partnerships and cements common interests between former enemies. Projects such as infrastructure development in border cities, water- and energy-sharing programs, and the expansion of cross-border industries can narrow socioeconomic gaps between regions and thus diminish poverty-fueled frustrations. Youth and sport programs promote positive interactions between conflict groups. Overall, open borders introduce globalization and intersocietal cooperation in industries such as tourism, information technology, sports, and entertainment. Peacebuilding establishes cooperative development as a building block, rather than an afterthought, in a region's peace strategy.

Creative diplomacy has a simple goal: to make everyone feel that they've won. Current negotiations often seem like tug-of-wars, with each side pulling as hard as it can to "win ground" and make sure it doesn't "lose out" on important concessions. The term *compromise* has negative connotations, when in fact it should be considered a truly positive engagement. In creative diplomacy, the tug-of-war rope is dropped and peacemaking instead focuses on the positive developments *both sides* will experience with the cultivation of lasting peace. This kind of interaction requires innovation and flexibility to overcome stubbornness, biased interpretations of historical events, and aggressive security arrangements. Creative diplomacy deals with security more sophisticatedly, reconciling military and civilian needs.

These four pillars are naturally interrelated and are to some degree interdependent. I call them "pillars" because they are the foundation on which modern peace must rest.

Part 3 presents methods for incorporating these four essential

pillars into a modern peace process. I lay out the conditions that have been proven to be conducive to peace and propose the planning of a new peace that involves analysis of public attitudes, innovation of negotiation and implementation techniques, and the creation of local, regional, and international peacemaking structures.

Part 4 integrates the concepts of parts 1 through 3 into a real, attainable peacemaking model for the Mediterranean region. This Pax Mediterraneo pertains to conflicts in Israel and Palestine, the Middle East, the former Yugoslavia, and Cyprus as well as to tensions between the northern and southern regions—southern Europe and northern Africa. As an extended case study, part 4 will be especially useful for students and practitioners of peace.

Finally, the conclusion outlines a new vision for the year 2020. I share the thoughts and hopes of some of humanity's greatest social and political figures, including Nelson Mandela, Shimon Peres, Mikhail Gorbachev, and others.

Peacemaking is about life and death. It demands that we honestly challenge our motives, values, and perceptions if we are to create and sustain real peace. The arguments in this book are based on empirical evidence from my extensive peacemaking experience as well as practical analysis from many peacemaking luminaries. Inherent in my subject matter is a Middle East bias. However, given the centrality of the Middle East conflict and the participation of virtually all major international players in the region, I do not believe that such a bias detracts from the global relevance of my proffered peacemaking model.

In fact, the Middle East faces the same critical battle as the rest of the world: the battle for peace in an environment full of obstacles, suspicion, and hostility. Just as there can be a "necessary war," so is there a "necessary peace." Our most brilliant minds must be directed toward such a battle—not peace at all costs, but a comprehensive, participatory peace that integrates the practical interests of all sides of the conflict and all parts of society. Such is the purpose of this book.

I am driven by both passion and pragmatism in my efforts toward a modern peacemaking model. The need for a new architecture of peace is clear, as are the consequences if we fail in our peacemaking efforts. When I consider the future of my four grandchildren, I wonder whether they will grow up in a culture of peace or in the throes of World War III. Will their generation experience headlines of hope or headlines of chemical attacks, nuclear threats, and widespread destruction?

The realization of either Armageddon or redemption depends on whether the world is able to create real, sustainable peace. The process of solving conflict and ending instability must begin in the endeavor for peace. Peace first.

PART I

The Challenge

Archaic Peace

CHAPTER ONE

Old-Fashioned Peacemaking

HISTORY IS BEING WRITTEN IN THE RED INK OF BLOOD AND not in the black ink of peace treaties.

For thousands of years, war has enabled countries and societies to conquer land, procure assets, and acquire power. As a result, any peace that follows from war has mostly focused on tangible achievements or failures, assets and power secured and squandered. The wise Chinese Communist leader Chou En-lai, paraphrasing Clausewitz, said, "All diplomacy is the continuation of war by other means."

The same can be said about peace. Peace treaties have traditionally declared an end to fighting; established formal, legally oriented relations; and included an inventory of assets, such as land, industrial resources, and prisoners of war, to be distributed upon the cessation of war—but not much more. Although such tangible acquisitions and losses have become less relevant in modern war, a model focused on security and assets is crystallized in the histories of most countries, whose peaceful reconciliation developed only after persistent struggles for influence, control, and colonies.

Peace represents a fundamental human freedom—the right to live. But peace, freedom, and democracy have been almost mutually exclusive throughout history. Even after democracy has permeated the international system, peace has continued to be a method to consolidate and distribute assets, territory, natural resources, and influence. When war was waged in the name of independence from colonial powers, such as the American Revolutionary War (1775–1783), some liberties and democratic elements resulted. However, even the US pursuit of peace by way of war discounted

the interests and human rights of the defeated side. Furthermore, the spoils of war were mostly guaranteed to the state, the government, and the elite.

Paradoxically, war has become a more participatory process than peace. This contradiction stems from our historical understanding of peace as a strategic concept rather than a human right. Western peacemaking and peace treaties, both domestic and international, have evolved only minimally from "real estate" treaties into broader documents pursuing peace.

In this chapter, I will first dissect a handful of case studies from modern Western history to illustrate the evolution of peacemaking. I will then extract the core failures of Western peacemaking and explain them in light of recent peace treaties. We begin with the world's current great superpower, the United States.

As early as the nineteenth century, treaties such as those between the US government and the Indian tribes (for example, the 1805 Chickasaw Treaty) were essentially real estate treaties based on the ceding of territory, the relinquishment and acquisition of property, and financial recompense.[1] The Barbary Treaties (1786–1816) between the US authorities and the king of Algiers were similarly formatted as commercial agreements pertaining to the distribution of chattels, outlining conservative security arrangements alluding to the expectation of future wars, and establishing formal diplomatic relations, including the free expression of religion.[2]

Such modes of "peaceful settlement" also were reflected in European peace treaties during the "age of nation-states" (from the mid-eighteenth century through the Crimean War of 1854–1856), the Second Industrial Revolution (1870–1914), the unifications of Germany and Italy (1871), the Danish-Prussian War (1864), the Austro-Prussian War (1866), and the Franco-Prussian War (1870–1871). The aims of these wars defined the nature of the peace that followed: the conquering and consolidation of territory in the Crimean War, in which Russia endeavored to extend its control over various Ottoman provinces; and the maintaining of monarchies and the unification of territory, which was Otto von Bismarck's

raison d'être. Although he was a master of diplomacy, Bismarck perceived peace as the amplification of German power and the acquisition of assets to strengthen coalitions.

Similarly, the Spanish-American War (1898) resulted in US control over former Spanish colonies in the Caribbean and Pacific. In a war of independence, Cuban rebels fought the Spanish while the US Congress passed joint resolutions proclaiming Cuba "free and independent." Spain broke off diplomatic relations with the United States, resulting in a declaration of war between the United States and Spain. The Treaty of Paris (1898) formally ended hostilities. The treaty gave the United States almost all of Spain's colonies and dealt with the relinquishment of Spanish property and associated rights—more like a property settlement following a divorce than a peace treaty. The First Amendment credo of equality and respect was not at all evident in this or in ensuing treaties between the United States and its former enemies.

Twentieth-century diplomacy begins prior to World War I (1914) and ends in 1990. Historian Eric Hobsbawm calls it a "century of extremism,"[3] which ran the gamut from fascism to communism, with commonalities characterizing both extremes. Additionally, a Eurocentric view was prevalent throughout this period; Europeans saw themselves as the center of the earth, not just physically but also culturally, believing that people on the periphery needed to be "acculturated" through imperialism.

Such arrogance was manifest in the Treaty of Versailles (1919),[4] which essentially served to guarantee assets, territories, and compensation—fundamental elements of imperial culture—and created a hegemonic narrative in which Germany was defeated and blamed. This defeat resulted in a sense of isolation and humiliation on the part of most Germans, whose sense of grievance was later exploited by Hitler in his quest for power.

Indeed, such a diktat can only survive temporarily. If a peace agreement is not reciprocal, providing both sides with an incentive for peace, it will not stand the test of time. The challenge of Versailles was to win the war and create a new international system

so that all sides could live together; instead, the human instinct for total victory dominated. This was the ultimate mistake of the architects of Versailles, and it became the impetus for totalitarianism in Germany.

In retrospect, the lessons of Versailles—including the contrast between the New World, symbolized by a vigorous America emerging as a global power, and the old colonial European world weighed down by tradition and resistance to change—penetrated the global peace agenda only after World War II. Perhaps the most significant consequence of this war over the long term was the rebalancing of world power and the establishment of two spheres of influence. Britain, France, Germany, and Japan ceased to be great powers in the traditional military sense, leaving only the United States and the Soviet Union. The failures of Versailles prompted the United States to work with Europe against the Soviet Union; the United States recruited Germany and Japan into cooperation instead of threatening a reprisal.

This movement toward cooperation is reflected in the North Atlantic Treaty (1949),[5] which emphasizes freedom of the individual, democracy, rule of law, and the protection of the heritage of the West. The agreement, which formed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), highlights a liberal, legal view with respect to stability and prosperity in the North Atlantic, not a totalitarian view of an inclusive peace. The NATO agreement was supported by the Marshall Plan (1947), an initiative of US Secretary of State George Marshall, which offered Europe up to $20 billion for relief if the European nations cooperated to create a reasonable aid plan.[6] The nations were obliged to work together and to act as a single economic unit, paving the way for European resource and infrastructure integration. But the example of regional cooperation in Europe has proven the exception to the rule. For most of history, the goal of nations has been to conquer land; peace has simply been the time between wars, during which groups prepared for the next conflict.

Modern history has since seen the rise of non-state-centric issues. Socioeconomic gaps between the haves and the have-nots are increasing. This phenomenon is connected to demographics, particularly in Europe—home to approximately fifty million Muslims[7]—and in the United States, where the Hispanic constituency is now an electoral power.[8] Furthermore, ecological issues such as water pollution and greenhouse gases have penetrated international borders, as have issues of human rights—not to speak of the globalized economy.

However, modern history has also seen the number of intense national conflicts and wars grow exponentially. As mentioned in the introduction, the Heidelberg Institute's Conflict Barometer has charted the rise of high- and medium-intensity conflicts, from fewer than twenty in 1945 to one hundred thirty in 2007.[9] An increase in conflicts has resulted in an increase of peace treaties—most of which have floundered.

Reflecting on historical treaties of the past several centuries, it's clear that their purpose has been to consolidate the acquisitions of war and to further traditional aims rather than to aspire to new directions of peaceful relations that emphasize a culture of peace and democratization. These treaties serve to sustain the status quo through the balance of power that results from war, achieving stability via narrow security doctrines based on deterrence. The militant nature of the traditional peace treaty reflects the nature of the peacemaker: most peacemakers are former warmakers who do not rule out the use of force as a possible solution to the conflict. This is true both in the realm of political leadership and in the recruitment of military personnel for peacemaking procedures.

Similarly, peace agreements aimed at consolidating assets, territories, and spheres of influence are not designed to equitably distribute peace dividends. Peace and its dividends have traditionally been claimed by states and their elites and have not been linked to greater social justice or the reduction of socioeconomic gaps. Economics has been represented in traditional peace treaties in terms

of spoils emanating from victory, with little mention of economic cooperation between former enemies. The notion of regional development, as well as the role of the international community in strengthening the peace economy, has been largely ignored.

Surprisingly, these gaps are present in peace processes even during this age of globalization. One might have expected globalization to change the nature of peacemaking, to include cooperation within a societal, regional, and global context, emphasizing the values of reconciliation, cooperation, and democratization. On the contrary; although globalization and technology have transformed the world into a global village on one level, particularly in those regions where territory and resources are dominant, peacemaking has not adopted new forms of intercultural exchange and economy.

Simply put, old-fashioned principles of peacemaking are as ineffective in modern times as they were historically, even in places where liberal values of democracy have penetrated legal systems and societies. Peace has not been recognized as a discernible, independent social value. In post-conflict regions, little effort has been made to create a participatory process, to cultivate an environment of peaceful coexistence between former enemies, or to discipline those who are violently opposed to peace.

Modern peace treaties—those of the past fifteen years—continue to fail because they fall into traps of old-fashioned peacemaking. Just like historical peacemaking efforts before them, these modern treaties

1. further traditional aims and dwell on the past;
2. reflect a narrow security doctrine;
3. fail to promote a culture of peace;
4. fail to establish a mechanism against increased socioeconomic gaps;
5. fail to emphasize economic cooperation;

6. lack planning for regional development and international assistance;
7. fail to promote peace socially and politically and lack implied sanctions against domestic opposition; and
8. involve past warmakers acting as peacemakers.

Not every modern peace agreement exhibits all of these flaws—some treaties include progressive peacemaking strategies alongside traditional approaches. Unfortunately, most attempts at modernizing peace have either been buried beneath outdated arrangements or have remained abstract concepts, forgotten by the time implementation rolls around. Here, I explore these core failures of modern peace treaties, using examples of peace agreements from the past decades.

1. **Furthering traditional aims and dwelling on the past.** The Dayton Accords (1995),[10] which were supposed to create peace in the former Yugoslavia, have left much of the region reduced to poverty, with massive economic disruption and persistent instability across the territories where the worst fighting occurred. The accords dealt mostly with the traditional aims of territorial integrity, military aspects of regional stabilization, and boundary demarcation. The wars were the bloodiest conflicts on European soil since the end of World War II, resulting in an estimated 125,000 dead and millions more driven from their homes.[11] Many of the key individual participants were subsequently charged with war crimes. The accords lack clauses relating to reconciliation or strategic peacebuilding efforts.

2. **Reflecting a narrow security doctrine.** The Peace Treaty and Principles of Interrelation between Russian Federation and Chechen Republic Ichkeria (1997) is a perfect example of a narrow security doctrine. The first two clauses of the treaty deal with the rejection of the "use of force" and the development of relationships according to the "norms of international law."[12] Its remaining three clauses have no bearing on peace at all—indeed, hostilities were being

sustained. Similarly, the Khasavyourt Joint Declaration and Principles for Mutual Relations (1996) signed by the Chechen and Russian parties takes into account only the "cessation of military activities" and the "inadmissibility of the use of armed force or threatening its usage."[13]

3. **Failure to promote a culture of peace.** A peace culture was not promoted by the Guatemalan Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace (1996).[14] During this civil war, guerilla groups orchestrated coups against the military regimes, an estimated 200,000 people were killed, and many human rights were violated.[15] The agreement outlined a cessation of violence and a redistribution of resources and compensation, but it did not address peacebuilding measures to create a culture of peace. Peace still is not present in Guatemala, more than a decade later.

4. **Failure to establish a mechanism against increased socioeconomic gaps.** More than two million people were displaced and an estimated thirty thousand people were killed during nine years of civil war in which the Sierra Leone government and a rebel group fought over the distribution of that country's resources.[16] The Peace Agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (1999)[17] was supposed to end this horrendous civil war; however, the agreement failed to outline methods of decreasing socioeconomic gaps, and to this day the country continues to be wracked with poverty and instability.

5. **Failure to emphasize economic cooperation.** This failure is particularly evident in the peace agreement signed in Khartoum by the government of Sudan and the South Sudan United Democratic Salvation Front (1997).[18] General Omar al-Bashir, head of the Khartoum government, came to power in an Islamist-backed coup in 1989 and had introduced elements of Sharia law, which was opposed by the mainly Christian and animist rebels in the south. The war between northern and southern Sudan has generally been interpreted as a typical ethno-religious conflict between Muslims

and Christians or between Arabs and Africans. Although this characterization was true of the earlier manifestation of the conflict, in the 1950s, and still has some bearing on the recent war, the nature of the conflict has changed. The fighting now is primarily over resources, with the economic and resource crisis in the north emerging as a driving force behind the civil war. The fourth section of the 1997 treaty mentioned a "comprehensive economic and social plan" and the establishment of "development projects," but these were not sufficiently emphasized or developed in this treaty, nor did ensuing agreements and declarations ensure their implementation. Fighting in south Sudan continues to this day.

6. **Lack of planning for regional development and international assistance.** The Belfast Agreement (also known as the Good Friday Agreement) (1998),[19] signed by the British and Irish governments, gained the support of most Northern Ireland political parties, including Sinn Fein (the political wing of the Irish Republican Army), and many of the positive characteristics outlined here are present in that agreement. However, many of the cooperative economic and social projects and other peacebuilding efforts outlined in the agreement have to a large degree not been implemented. Perhaps the addition of a clause relating to international assistance on facilitation and finance would have resulted in more cooperation and more effective implementation of the agreement.

7. **Failure to promote peace socially and politically, and lack of implied sanctions against domestic opposition.** The 1997 treaty between the Russian Federation and Chechen Republic Ichkeria[20] lacks sanctions against domestic opposition. Despite a series of peace agreements (including a cease-fire offered by Chechen President Aslan Mashkadov in June 2000), rebel fighting, suicide attacks, and guerilla warfare by Chechen combatants have continued. Between 300,000 and 600,000 Chechen people are said to have fled their homes as a result of this violence.[21]

8. **Past warmakers acting as peacemakers.** This core failure is manifest in all modern treaties. Of the eight participants who

negotiated the 1999 peace agreement for national reconciliation in Sierra Leone, for example, five were military personnel.[22] Similarly, in Sudan, all parties who negotiated the 1997 peace agreement were military agents.

Sometimes, treaties that end domestic conflict are more realistic than those between countries; they often contain important social rehabilitation, peacebuilding, and developmental elements. The 1996 agreement between Guatemalan rebels and President Alvaro Arzu, and the 1998 Belfast Agreement both hold true to this observation.

In addition to promising an end to a conflict that displaced an estimated one million people,[23] the Guatemalan agreement also outlined land reforms, bilingualism in education, retraining programs for ex-guerrillas, and a decrease in military numbers and budgets. A truth and reconciliation commission headed by a UN official was established in 1994.[24] But implementation failed—as it so often does—and fighting between the military and guerilla groups continues today.

A more successful example is the Belfast Agreement, a major step in the Northern Ireland peace process that began with the 1993 John Hume–Gerry Adams talks. The Belfast Agreement has included peacebuilding activities and some, though not sufficient, economic joint ventures.

On the whole, peacemaking has not experienced a fundamental change since decolonization. In most cases, it still addresses the considerations of the past. With the dissolution of traditional spheres of influence, however, the interests of nation-states have changed. Human nature hasn't changed, but the perception of power has. Power is no longer interpreted as the conquest of land or colonies; the modern world understands power mostly in terms of economics, knowledge, industry, and technology.

Societies may consider war profitable because the victor stands to gain a great deal of power in the modern sense. Nonetheless, truly greater power lies in peace. Peace allows nations to focus

their energies on trade, cultural enrichment, and scientific exchange rather than on military expenditures. Peace can be viewed as a tool for change: it does not merely exist in relation to war and the acquisition of territorial assets—it can facilitate stability, cooperation, and mutual enhancement between societies.

To understand peacemaking in an era of globalization and democratization, we need to explore not only modern peace treaties but also decisions and implementation. I have experienced this blessing and burden as Israel's chief negotiator in the Oslo process—a process that made great strides forward but still struggled with the failings of traditional peacemaking, as I will discuss in the next chapter.

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