Strategic Leadership

The General’s Art

Editors

Mark R. Grandstaff, PhD

Georgia Sorenson, PhD

Strategic Leadership

The General’s Art

CHAPTER 1

Creating a Culture of Leadership Development

George E. Reed, PhD

During the first weeks of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Sergeant First Class Paul R. Smith led an engineer unit as part of an infantry task force that was advancing toward the Baghdad airport. While constructing an enemy prisoner of war holding area, the unit was attacked by a force of over a hundred enemy fighters armed with automatic weapons and rocket-propelled grenades. Outnumbered and nearly surrounded, Sergeant Smith engaged the enemy with grenades, an antitank weapon, and small arms while directing the fire and movements of his soldiers. After several of his soldiers were injured, he realized that the enemy had the upper hand. Sergeant Smith then climbed into the hatch of a disabled armored vehicle and exposed himself to enemy fire in order to employ a .50 caliber machine gun in an attempt to delay the advance. He was successful in disrupting the enemy attack, but in the process he was mortally wounded.

His fellow soldiers honored him for his courageous leadership and for saving the lives of his men. Sergeant Smith’s sister later recounted that he “had an incredible love for the troops under his command. . . . In the last letter that Paul Smith wrote from Iraq to our parents, he told them that now that he was a father himself, he realized just how much they had sacrificed to make his life a good life and he thanked them for that special effort. He spoke of being prepared to give—as he said—‘all that I am, to ensure that all my boys make it home.’ In that same letter, he told our parents how proud he was of the ‘privilege to be given 25 of the finest Americans we call Soldiers to lead into war,’ and he recognized their fears and his responsibilities for their welfare.” ¹ Congress celebrated his sacrifice by awarding him the nation’s most revered medal—the Medal of Honor. In a touching ceremony at the White House, his wife and children received the medal in his stead.

One might well ask, “What do the actions of a senior noncommissioned officer, heroic as they are, have to do with strategic leadership or culture development in a large and complex organization?” The question reflects a common misunderstanding about levels of leadership. The actions of strategic leaders have a direct connection to, and impact on, those on the front line. Sergeant Smith’s actions demonstrate that such efforts to imbue a warrior ethos and develop responsible leaders of character make a difference. Long before Sergeant Smith’s unit took to the field, strategic leaders had created a culture of leadership development by providing a vision and example of what Army leaders should be, know, and do. They then defined requirements and allocated the financial resources for leadership schools and courses.

The public and private sectors outside the military are increasingly recognizing the value of strategic leadership as a means to obtain a competitive edge in a volatile and unpredictable environment. A 2004 Executive Development Trends survey identified the following top objectives for executive development in the next two to three years: (1) increasing bench strength, (2) accelerating the development of high-potentials, (3) communicating vision and strategy, (4) supporting change and transformation, and (5) developing individual leader capabilities. ² Furthermore, in a 2005 survey, respondents were asked to identify gaps in the next generation’s capabilities. Deficiencies most frequently cited included:

Ability to create a vision and engage others so they feel ownership and passion about achieving it (58 percent)

Understanding of the total enterprise, how the different parts work together to leverage their collective capabilities to serve customers/clients better than the competition (56 percent)

Strategic thinking (55 percent)

Cooperation and collaboration with other parts of the business to (1) optimize the operations of our business and (2) to leverage our collective capabilities in the marketplace to identify and serve customers/clients better than the competition

Leadership (46 percent). ³

The Army has taught these principles to its future leaders for a long time. While it is true that the Army is not a business in a conventional sense, as an enterprise it faces challenges that global business leaders would easily recognize. The Army is as a large and complex organization of 1.23 million members spread across 17 strategic business units operating in 120 countries. It operates with a budget of over $100 billion in fiscal year 2006, and it faces a high-risk, competitive, dangerous, and rapidly changing environment. Moreover, a recent Korn/Ferry report found that many former military members serve in the private sector as chief executive officers. This alone attests to the fact that leadership skills learned in the military enhance success in corporate life. Key military leadership traits that translate well to business leadership include learning how to work as part of a team; organizational skills, such as planning and effective use of resources; good communication skills; defining a goal and motivating others to follow it; a highly developed sense of ethics; and the ability to remain calm under pressure. ⁴

WHAT IS A CULTURE OF LEADERSHIP?

A culture of leader development exists when supervisors agree that it is their duty to develop their subordinates to meet their full potential, and when organization members at all levels strive to achieve the next level of responsibility. There must be a commitment that development remain a priority, even in the midst of budgetary and operational pressures. Certain personnel policies and resource decisions, coupled with constant emphasis by senior leaders, should further reinforce this commitment.

Several policies and mechanisms in the Army combine to powerfully reinforce this type of culture:

A shared framework and vocabulary for thinking and talking about leadership (leadership doctrine).

A three-part model for leader development consisting of institutional training and education, operational assignments, and self-development.

A sequential and progressive system of training and education through well-resourced institutional schools and courses (the system of professional military education).

Assignment policies that maximize development by ensuring that all members progress through steadily increasing positions of responsibility.

Funding for education and training that is centralized. Costs are transparent to the sending organization.

Organizations that do not suffer extended personnel losses when sending personnel to schools and courses.

Promotions and key assignments tied to successful completion of professional schools and courses.

Leaders responsible for developing leaders. Leader development is not simply a human resources function.

Personnel policies which require that to remain in the organization, members must be promoted within a specified period of time (“up or out”).

THE ARMY’S LEADERSHIP FRAMEWORK

In the Army, clear lines of supervision are considered a virtue, while status, prestige, and power are largely distributed on the basis of rank and position. It should not be a surprise, then, that the Army leadership framework takes a stratified approach to the phenomenon (Figure 1-1). In other words, the Army leadership framework considers three levels of leadership: direct (or tactical level, which is focused at the team or unit level); organizational (focused on systems and processes); and strategic (global or regional perspective). ⁵

These levels of leadership have strong face validity to anyone who has tried to make a transition from first-line supervisor to middle manager or from mid-level to executive leadership. What makes a person successful at one level will not ensure success at the next. There may even be skills and abilities that are highly rewarded at one level but that can be disastrous at other levels. As an example, quick decision-making with limited information, accompanied by technically competent and forceful execution, is a virtue at the tactical (or direct) level; at the strategic level, however, patience, negotiation, and consensus, combined with synthesis and integration skills, are absolutely necessary. This then sets an organizational imperative to prepare individuals for the demands of different levels and provides a framework for building a system of professional schools and courses.

FIGURE 1-1. Army leadership framework.

The Army also makes an extensive investment in the education and development of its leaders. Over a 20-year career, a typical Army officer might spend 4 years or more in schools and courses that sometimes include fully funded graduate studies in civilian universities. Although there are differences between officers, noncommissioned officers, and the civilian workforce, all have access to a system of professional development schools and courses. This is a massive investment when you consider the operational demands the Army faces during times of conflict. Some of the more extensive school programs, such as the U.S. Army War College, last for up to ten months, a period during which many of the “best and brightest” are unavailable for field assignments or missions. ⁶

The Army, like all branches of the military, has a system of sequential schools and courses that are specifically designed to help leaders prepare for the next level of responsibility. Where there are known transition points, such as from enlisted soldier to noncommissioned officer, or from junior officer to field grade, there is a mandatory school to prepare them. These courses are not simply offered as options; they are prerequisites or “gateways” that must be completed before serving at the next level. They are considered rewards for effective performance and an essential preparation for promotion.

Education is thus tightly linked to a personnel system that handles promotions and selection for key assignments. Personnel policies serve as important drivers of organizational culture in the Army. Two are especially important: the “up or out” policy, which mandates that soldiers must either be promoted within a specified period of time or leave, and the lack of a mechanism to hire those from outside the organization into senior leadership positions. There are no career privates in the Army. Every soldier is preparing for promotion to the next level of responsibility. One either moves up the promotion ladder or is out of the Army. Given that one does not, under normal circumstances, qualify for retirement benefits until one has 20 years of service, there is a powerful motivation to make progress. Being passed over for promotion sends a clear message that one should look for another job.

When that policy is combined with the harsh realities of the battlefield, which demand that subordinates stand ready to assume the role of a wounded leader, the Army has compelling reasons for extending developmental opportunities to the lowest levels of the organization. Succession planning is therefore an inherent part of daily operations. Instead of focusing on educating and developing a few with the highest potential for leadership, the Army extends developmental opportunities to all soldiers. The Army is a closed system in terms of advancement. It does not hire executives from other walks of life, and this means that the generals of tomorrow are the lieutenants of today. Because it is impossible to determine with any accuracy which junior officers or noncommissioned officers will reach senior leadership, the institution must distribute leader development to all.

The system of professional military education works for another reason—two key processes and procedures, both of which are rarely observed outside the military: the Trainees, Holdees, and Students (TTHS) account and a policy of centralized funding for schools and courses. The TTHS account is a device that, in addition to other uses, provides a holding point for soldiers when they are undergoing entry-level training, attending long-term schools and courses, or moving from one post to another. It works something like this: Let’s say a soldier is selected to attend a long-term developmental course. During the period of attendance, the soldier will be placed in the TTHS account and charted as a loss to his or her unit. This means that the personnel system will assign a replacement with roughly the equivalent grade and abilities in that person’s place. Upon graduation, the schooled soldier will travel to an assignment appropriate to the newfound skills and abilities. This prevents organizations from suffering long periods with vacant positions. It also eliminates a powerful disincentive for sending high-potentials to schools and courses. Although the TTHS account is often targeted as a source of “overhead” and something to be minimized, it is rarely reduced in size, nor should it be. It is actually a mechanism that fuels a robust educational system that pays great dividends over time.

Centralized funding of educational programs also eliminates powerful disincentives that can confound leadership-development initiatives. In many organizations, when an employee is selected to attend even an in-house developmental course, the cost is assessed against the sending business unit. Put another way, if the marketing department wants to send an employee to a school or course, marketing must budget for that course and will be decremented for the cost of attendance as a measure of cost accounting. Although this may be a good way to capture costs for training and education, it also dissuades supervisors from sending employees, especially when budgets are tight. When costs are transparent to the sending organization and are centrally controlled, it sends the message that development is important as an organizational investment, not simply an operating cost that is to be controlled and minimized.

THE ARMY’S APPROACH TO LEADER DEVELOPMENT

The Army’s approach to leader development can be seen as resting on three pillars (Figure 1-2): institutional training in the sequential and progressive network of professional schools and courses; operational assignments designed to stretch and develop leadership capacity “on the job”; and self-development, which is largely an individual responsibility. ⁷ In the Army, leadership is not simply a human resource function, although the Human Resources Command plays an important role in the processes of assignments and selection. Leaders are expected to coach, encourage, develop, and in some cases mentor other leaders. In the words of Department of the Army Pamphlet 350-58,

As leader development unfolds in each of the three pillars, a continuing cycle of education and training, experience, assessment, feedback, and reinforcement and remediation occurs. . . . During this leader development process, the responsibility for a leader’s complete development is mutually shared by the leaders of the Army education system, commanders and leaders in the field, and the leaders themselves. ⁸

FIGURE 1-2. Army leader development model. ⁹

The notion of pillars suggests that leader development would be incomplete or flawed without all three.

While institutional training and operational assignments are relatively obvious, self-development is worthy of some additional exploration. Self-development and reflection can be seen in an emphasis on professional reading and pursuit of civilian educational programs. The institution supports self-development through such measures as providing tuition assistance for civilian education, staffing military education centers with advisors, and providing resources designed to foster lifelong learning. As an example of senior leader emphasis on professional reading, in the preface to the Army Chief of Staff’s reading list published by the Center of Military History, General Peter J. Schoomaker points out the importance of professional reading: “I challenge all leaders to make a focused, personal commitment to read, reflect, and learn about our profession and our world. Through the exercise of our minds, our Army will grow stronger.” ¹⁰

THE U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE AND THE EDUCATION OF STRATEGIC LEADERS

The U.S. Army War College represents the pinnacle educational experience for the professional Army officer. After about 18 to 20 years of exceptional service, the top performers are selected to engage in a developmental experience—a 10-month course designed to prepare them for even greater responsibility. Selection for attendance does not necessarily mean that these officers will become generals, but they will not be selected as general officers unless they successfully complete this level of education. A distinguished senior officer recently reminded the members of class that although they were most likely acutely aware of their many deficiencies and might consider themselves “just one of the guys or gals,” they would soon be “running this thing [the Army].” He noted that their very presence at the Army War College indicated that they were very important to the success of the Department of Defense. ¹¹

It is at the Army War College that officers move from the study of tactics of battles and compliance with established procedures to the theory and art of war and strategy, international relations, global economics, and civil-military relations. The Army War College’s faculty recognizes that it may well be more difficult to build an Army than to fight one, so emphasis is placed on the mechanisms of managing at the executive level. The core curriculum is designed to produce graduates who can:

Distinguish the uniqueness of strategic-level leadership and apply competencies required by strategic leaders

Use strategic thought processes to evaluate the national security challenges and opportunities facing the United States in the twenty-first century

Evaluate the theory of war and strategy

Evaluate Department of Defense, joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational, and nongovernmental processes and relationships, including Army contributions to the nation in peace and war

Evaluate the role of the Army in joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational operations

Synthesize theater strategies, estimates, and campaign plans to employ military power in a unified, joint, multinational, and interagency environment

Synthesize critical elements, enablers, and processes that define the strategic environment in peace and war

Study and discuss the current and future state of the American military profession. ¹²

After attendees complete the core curriculum, they select from a number of electives to round out their education. Some pursue newfound areas of interest, while others seek to develop areas that need some additional attention based on their experiences in the core curriculum.

The ten-month curriculum at the Army War College recognizes that, in the words of America’s preeminent executive coach, Marshall Goldsmith, “What got you here won’t get you there.” ¹³ It is designed to expand perspectives and develop thought patterns that lead to a greater probability of success in the strategic environment. As an example, let’s consider the opening block of instruction, “Fundamentals of Strategic Thinking.” While recognizing that those selected to attend the College have been quite successful and have amassed a repertoire of effective leadership abilities, the course offers participants an opportunity to retune some cognitive approaches that are most suitable for a graduate-level educational program and for strategic-level responsibilities.

It is essentially a course that addresses not what to think but how to think. Specifically, it focuses on five cognitive domains of signature importance to senior-level leadership: critical thinking, creative thinking, systems thinking, ethical reasoning, and historical thinking. In the early part of the course, faculty and participants strive to create a supportive learning environment where assumptions can be challenged, dialogue supplants dogma, and all involved assume shared responsibility for learning. The faculty goes about facilitating this learning environment with great intent. They know that if they get the chemistry right in the early days, the class will reap the benefits throughout the year.

Most of the seminar members are used to working within a hierarchy. In the seminar; however, there are no such divisions in rank—all are equals. The War College Seminar, a group of 15 to 17 students and 3 faculty members, is the prime learning community. The seminar studies and learns together throughout the year and forges deep connections that often last far beyond a military career. Although faculty members are usually colonels and most participants are lieutenant colonels or equivalent, the faculty insists that they be referred to by their first names. Faculty and students alike have the option of wearing business attire, which can help break down barriers of rank. Every effort is taken to ensure that ideas and dialogue are not sacrificed to status or position. This can be unsettling to some, but it is also necessary preparation for dealing with organizations outside the Department of Defense. Graduates of the War College are expected to work with interagency partners who are not necessarily impressed with military rank and position.

The first writing assignment provides an opportunity to assess participants’ writing ability. When this assignment is combined with an objective evaluation that assesses writing mechanics, the faculty can identify those who would benefit from additional instruction. Because effective writing and speaking are of such extraordinary importance to senior leadership, they are a focus throughout the academic year. Although many officers believe they are good writers, they are often more comfortable with technical writing appropriate for e-mails, point papers, and PowerPoint presentations than the kind of expressive writing appropriate for inspiring others and communicating with outside audiences. All attendees are required to complete an extensive strategy research paper as a requisite to graduation. This project, similar in many ways to a thesis, is designed to address contemporary issues of importance to the profession, and unless the topics contain classified information, they are made available to the public through the Defense Technical Information Center.

All participants are expected to work with a faculty advisor to develop an individual learning plan. The plan, developed in the first weeks of the course, addresses both personal and professional goals and objectives. It is intended to guide the student through the many choices and options that arise during the year, including the selection of electives and complementary programs. Students also have the opportunity to take a battery of psychometric instruments that provide extensive information about their leadership skills and attributes. One such instrument—similar to a 360-degree assessment—provides them with an assessment of their leadership by superiors, peers, and subordinates. Skilled counselors and psychologists then provide detailed feedback to the participants. When the assessments are combined with the individual learning plan, the result is an opportunity for extensive growth and development.

Throughout the year, attendees are given the opportunity to participate in a host of extracurricular and complementary programs. The intramural sports program contributes to social bonding as much as to fitness, and many learning opportunities include family members. The Military Family Program is a source of pride at the Army War College because it provides resources and information useful to those in their early forties. It addresses such varied items as financial planning for retirement, preparing children for college admission, and caring for aging parents.

Furthermore, senior officers and government officials recognize that the Army War College class is an important audience. A host of lectures provide ample opportunity to engage speakers from the highest levels of government. President George W. Bush recently gave a policy speech at the College, and former Secretary of State Colin Powell commemorated a chair established in his honor. The College often invites speakers who provide alternative or critical viewpoints in an effort to expand perspectives and prepare attendees to deal with the varied opinions that are part of the rich tapestry of American society. During the last week of the academic year, guests invited from across the nation join the Army War College in an event known as the National Security Seminar. It is here that the guests, invited by students and faculty, interact with the class and with guest speakers. They get a taste of the College experience and provide a healthy seasoning to the final week of the course. Because most of them have no formal association with the military, they come to appreciate the complexities of the strategic environment and the intellect of the attendees.

One novel approach to leadership development at the Army War College is the Strategic Leader Staff Ride (see Chapter 12). In one sense it is a case study unlike any other. Students are paired with faculty members, and together they visit the Gettysburg National Military Park. There the focus is not so much on tactics or operational concepts as on the ideas that strategic leaders should keep in mind. These include how “winning or losing” affects public opinion and political resolve to carry on the fight. Although there is significant discussion of Pickett’s Charge and the actions of the 20th Maine at Little Round Top, there are also important points about the volatility and uncertainty of situations in battle. Events on the battlefield provide an opportunity to discuss the impact of recruiting, retention, financial, and personnel systems. At Gettysburg, faculty members visually impress upon their students that strategic leadership is about understanding the big picture.

This unique experience is not reserved for students alone. The Strategic Leader Staff Ride proves to be a valuable opportunity for the faculty of the College to meet and exchange ideas with leaders in the private sector. Several times a year, groups from some of America’s most successful and well-known companies visit the Army War College for an innovative two-to three-day program. With Army War College historians and leadership scholars, the guests visit Gettysburg, where they examine the events of the battlefield for immutable lessons. More than just a tour of the battlefield, the experience serves as a platform to address issues of leadership and management.

The guests then have the opportunity to dialogue with faculty members on a menu of topics, such as developing strategic leaders, strategy, and organizational change. Faculty members who participate in this program admit that while the program is part of the Army’s strategic communications effort, it is also an opportunity to learn from those outside the military and a way to share best leadership practices in a rapidly changing world. Some groups use this event as an executive off-site where they make important decisions for their organizations. In a discussion with former General Electric Chief Executive Officer Jack Welch, one Army colonel said that Welch told him that he had changed a part of GE’s business plan because of what he had learned on the Gettysburg staff ride.

NOTES

1. For a full account of Sergeant First Class Paul Ray Smith’s heroism, visit the website that commemorates Medal of Honor awardees at http://www.army.mil/medalofhonor/smith (accessed 6 June 2007).

2. James F. Bolt, “Mapping the Future of Leadership Development,” The 2007 Pfeiffer Annual: Leadership Development, James F. Bolt, ed. (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2007): 3–23.

3. Ibid., 10.

4. Tim Duffy and Dan Armstrong, Military Experience and CEOs: Is There a Link? (Los Angeles: Korn/Ferry International, 2006).

5. Department of the Army, “Field Manual 6-22—Army Leadership” (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 2006): 3–6.

6. Despite the extensive manpower cost, the U.S. Army War College closed only once—during World War II—a decision viewed in retrospect as a mistake. See H.P. Ball, Of Responsible Command: A History of the U.S. Army War College, rev. ed. (Carlisle, PA: Alumni Association of the U.S. Army War College, 1994).

7. Department of the Army, “2005 Posture Statement,” available online at http://www.army.mil/aps/05/training.html (accessed 14 June 2007).

8. Department of the Army, “Pamphlet 350-58—The Enduring Legacy: Leader Development for America’s Army” (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1994): 4.

9. Ibid.

10. Department of the Army, Center for Military History, “CMH Pub 105-5-1—The U.S. Army Chief of Staff’s Professional Reading List,” available online at http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/reference/CSAList/CSAReadingList.pdf (accessed 14 June 2007).

11. It is the convention of the U.S. Army War College to avoid attributing by name remarks made by guest speakers. The non-attribution policy encourages guests to speak freely and frankly without fear of being quoted outside the institution. It is therefore appropriate to reference such comments in some what vague terms, as in this case.

12. The U.S. Army War College institutional learning objectives are available online at http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/daa/external_site/Objectives.shtml (accessed 1 August 2007).

13. Marshall Goldsmith and Mark Reiter, What Got You Here Won’t Get You There: How Successful People Become Even More Successful (New York: Hyperion, 2007).

14. To read about Major Rozelle in his own words, see David Rozelle, Back in Action: An American Soldier’s Story of Courage, Faith and Fortitude (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, 2005).